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Carl Ramey's Mass Media Unleashed
Henry Geller*
This superb book treats an important issue: the proper regulatory
policy for broadcasting in the twenty-first century.! Before doing so, it
discusses the necessary background in a most comprehensive fashion,
including numerous supporting footnotes that enable further exploration of
the points made. Thus, it describes today's mass media, and their
performance under existing policy. As to policy, the book sets out the role
and dismal performance of the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"), Congress, and the courts (e.g., the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit).
The book treats two policies: the public trustee policy and the
deregulatory market policy, which was introduced in 1980 and has now
reached full fruition. The former is based on the consideration that more
people want to broadcast than there are available frequencies or channels,
that the government chooses one licensee, and therefore, that one must act
as a trustee for the public.2 The governing act specifies the public interest
areas-contributing to an informed citizenry, acting as a local outlet, and
serving the educational needs of children. In these areas, the broadcaster
must necessarily, at times, put public service first over maximizing profits.
Ramey has shown that even before the deregulation period, this public
trustee scheme did not work. The FCC for many years used an
ascertainment approach when what was needed was quantitative guidelines
as to minimum amounts of informational programs, including those of local
origin and educational children's fare. Even during the period when the
FCC had quantitative guidelines, they were never implemented. As Ramey
states, no station ever lost a license based on inadequate informational or
* Henry Geller was Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information
in the Carter Administration and was General Counsel of the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") from 1964-1970. He was also associated with several universities,
especially Duke University.
1. CARL R. RAMEY, MASS MEDIA UNLEASHED: How WASHINGTON POLICYMAKERS
SHORTCHANGED THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (2007).

2. Id. at 170.
3. Id. at 202-203.
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educational programs. 4 He points to the egregious renewal of the WLBT
station in Jackson, Mississippi, which was shown to have broadcast only
the segregationist views of a raging current issue and only one fifteen
minute early morning show for African Americans, even though they
represented forty-five percent of the local population.5
The lesson to be drawn from this history is that behavioral content
regulation is simply unworkable in this sensitive First Amendment area.
This was demonstrated again in the 1990s when the FCC adopted a weekly
three-hour guideline for so-called "core educational programming"
(programs that not only entertain but also are designed to educate either in
a cognitive or a social purpose fashion). Implementation has again been
inadequate, with studies showing that a substantial number of programs
being relied upon by commercial broadcasters were not educational in any
sense, and the number that might be so termed were all social purpose in
nature (e.g., "Inside the NBA," to teach youngsters leadership). As Ramey
points out, viewers soon learned to rely upon public television and certain
cable channels for educational programs.6
Ramey soundly calls this public trustee approach a charade.7 There
have been high costs to this charade, and not just the loss of public service
programming, as important as that is. Take the undermining of the
allocation scheme of local outlets, for example. With many radio stations
controlled by the large national owners with little or no local fare, and with
many TV stations doing no local news or other local programming, there is
a huge misallocation of valuable spectrum that could be better used for
mobile or similar telecommunications. TV stations that do not render
significant local service, but rather rely primarily on entertainment such as
movies or syndicated shows, could be replaced by satellite or powerful
regional stations instead of the present local assignments.
Ramey points out that the FCC embarked on a deregulatory market
approach in the 1980s. In 1981, it adopted "postcard renewal" for radio
and, in 1984, for TV.8 In the same decade, it eliminated both its cap on
commercials for commercial TV and the fairness doctrine. 9 In the 1996
Telecommunications Act, Congress greatly promoted the deregulatory
model by lengthening the license term from three to eight years and
eliminating the comparative renewal opportunity (where a competitor could
come in and challenge the incumbent by seeking to show that it could
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 226.
Id. at xiv-xv.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40-41; Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251, etseq. (2006).

Number 2]

MASS MEDIA UNLEASHED

render better public service).' 0 It directed the FCC to review its regulations
every two years (now every four) to determine whether they should be
eliminated in light of competitive developments."
There have certainly been strong competitive developments, as
Ramey describes: 11,000 radio stations, 1,366 TV stations, and even more
significant, cable and satellite with their many channels and the Internet
commencing to have a substantial and growing impact.' 2 But as Ramey
also points out, there is no basis whatsoever for thinking that increased
market pressure would result in more public service by the commercial
broadcasters.' 3 In the face of this ever-growing competition and
deregulation in the public trustee field, why would a commercial TV
station decide to present public service programs like in-depth
informational shows or a cognitive child's program? The situation is akin
to an argument that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") should
decide to abandon its antipollution rules in the light of increasing
competition in the industry.
Ramey proposes to end the charade and adopt a far-reaching new
policy. I agree with the heart of that new policy, namely, instead of seeking
to obtain public service by using behavioral content regulation to try to
make commercial broadcasters act against their driving financial interest
(and in a time of increasing competitive pressure), he would free them
completely from public trustee requirements and would take modest sums
from them for the benefit of public broadcasting. 14 This would reduce any
lingering First Amendment strains on commercial TV, and, most
importantly, the policy would rely upon an entity, public broadcasting,
which wants to deliver high quality public service. That is its sole reason
for existing. For the first time, government policy would be in accord with
the driving considerations of the field.
I do have some differences from Ramey's proposed policy, none of
which are major.' 5 As Ramey notes, I suggested a five percent annual fee
on the gross revenue of commercial TV stations (about $1.25 billion). 16 I
did so because (i) that fee would approximate the allowable franchise fee in
10. Id. at 214.

11. Id. at 46.
12. Id. at 203.
13. Id. at202.
14. Id. at 217-21.
15. For example, Ramey restricts the deregulated TV stations by requiring only
broadcast operations. In the digital era, a large part of the channel's 19.4 Mbs (e.g., all but
3Mbs) can be used for nonbroadcast operations. So long as no interference is caused to
broadcast or other operations, why should the now deregulated licensee not be allowed to
use the facility for whatever use it deems to have highest value?
16. MASS MEDIA UNLEASHED, supra note 2, at 242, n. 64.
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cable and (ii) the proposed public TV trust fund needs such a continuing
source of revenue to successfully produce and publicize its expanded high
quality efforts in cultural, children's, and in-depth informational
programming. Ramey believes that this proposal would face great
opposition from the commercial broadcasters and therefore proposes a
much more moderate approach, largely relying on fees now paid by the
commercial broadcasters under the present regulatory scheme.' 7
Ramey's pragmatic judgment is reasonable in the circumstances.
However, I believe that in light of the increasing costs of TV production
and the great need for public TV to supply high-quality public service,
public TV should have the option of auctioning its spectrum, if the need for
this course is shown, with the large sums thus gained added to its trust
fund. Delivery of programming is not a crucial problem for public TV, with
options such as cable, satellite, the Internet, and DVDs available;
production of the programming is the critical problem.
Contrary to Ramey's proposal, I would not apply the public trustee
regulatory scheme, with a restored fairness doctrine, to public TV. The
system does need governance reform, and a new governing board could be
established in a manner insuring prestigious members with high integrity
and interest in public service areas.' 8 This board could act like the Board of
Governors of BBC and could assure compliance with congressional
directives as to matters like fair and balanced journalism and elimination of
the inappropriate commercial practices that are so pervasive today as a
result of the financially starved condition of public TV.
On indecency, I agree with Ramey that the FCC should not be
involved in enforcing the criminal statute and that the matter should be left
wholly to the courts, with Department of Justice ("DOJ") participation.' 9

17. Id. at 242-43.
18. For example, the following recommendation made as to CPB could be used for the
new governing board:
[T]he Task Force recommends that in the future the president appoint a
distinguished commission from the fields of broadcasting, education, the sciences,
the arts, and the humanities to recommend five outstanding candidates for each
vacancy .... The president would make his choice from the list, or if he is
dissatisfied, ask the commission for more names. This method of appointment
would guarantee a high level of leadership in public broadcasting, and would help
to insulate public broadcasting more effectively from political influence without in
any way lessening its accountability.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, QUALITY TIME? THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

FUND TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC TELEVISION 36 (1993). The writer was a Task Force member.
19. MAss MEDIA UNLEASHED, supra note 2, at 225; 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). 1 should
disclose here that with Professor Glen 0. Robinson, former FCC Commissioner, I filed an
amicus brief in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) (See Brief
of Former FCC Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and in Support of
Declaration That Indecency Enforcement Violates the First Amendment.) On June 4, 2007,
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Ramey is also on target when he points out that it makes no sense,
practically speaking, to have vigorous indecency enforcement as to overthe-air TV broadcasting, and, because of sound constitutional
considerations, no indecency application as to subscription services like
cable and satellite and to the Internet. 20 Further, consider that even as to
broadcasting, eighty-five percent of viewers receive such service over a
subscription operation, with blocking of unwanted programming available,
and that in February of 2009, just a year from now, all TV will be digital,
again enabling blocking. In these circumstances, I believe that the only
sound way to proceed is to eliminate the entire indecency regime as
unnecessary and unconstitutional.
Another prong of Ramey's proposed policy is to eliminate FCC
enforcement of its ownership and related rules, and instead to expand
antitrust enforcement by the DOJ or the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"). 2' I agree that this would be desirable. As Ramey shows, both the
FCC and the Congress, especially in the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
have undermined the important diversification principle-to diversify the
sources of information coming to the American people.2 2 I would place
enforcement with the FTC, an independent agency with bipartisan
composition, with explicit direction to act not only on economic facts but
also on diversification considerations. In light of the poor record of the
FCC, it would be constructive to have a new agency, the FTC, with a new
explicit diversification mandate.23
With the complete deregulation contemplated by Ramey (and as
further suggested by me as to public TV), it would be appropriate for the
first time to replace the five-member FCC with a single administrator
within the Executive Branch (similar to the EPA). The administrator would
not be called upon to handle sensitive or political matters, such as
licensing, ownership caps, or political broadcast rulings.2 4 There are
the court issued an opinion remanding the case to the FCC to explain why it changed policy
(i.e., abandoned a cautious and restrained enforcement policy). Petition for certiorari is now
pending before the Supreme Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (Nov. 1, 2007).
20. MASS MEDIA UNLEASHED, supra note 2, at 225-26.
21. Id. at234.
22. Id. at 179. Ramey cites and quotes the statement of the Supreme Court in
Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), that the First Amendment "rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."
23. Ramey indicates that with the elimination of public service obligations, the cable
"must carry" rules might fail to a considerable extent. But these rules were sustained not on
any public service content considerations, but rather on competitive grounds, stemming
from cable's monopoly "gatekeeper" position. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994).
24. I have not dealt with the important issue of free political broadcast time, as urged by
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benefits with such a reform: greater efficiency, reduced costs, and
heightened accountability. The President is responsible for Executive
Branch activities and thus has to take greater care both with the
appointment and the retention of the administrator. As a further example of
promoting effective policy making, administration of the all-important
spectrum area would come under a single focal point, instead of the present
split between government and nongovernment. To gauge the difference,
examine the effectiveness of the Director General of Telecommunications
("DGT"), supported by the Office of Telecommunications ("OFTEL"), in
the United Kingdom as against the multimember FCC.25
This brings me to my final comment-Ramey's acknowledgment of
the great difficulty of effecting his proposed policy reform.26 He is certainly
right about that, and my additional suggestion of a single administrator is
so "over the top" as to invoke the phrase, "in your dreams." The opposition
would come from many quarters-including Congress, which likes its
present regulatory power over broadcast TV; the powerful commercial
broadcasters, who like being called public trustees so long as there is no
striving to obtain
real enforcement; and public interest groups, who are still
27
public service from the commercial broadcasting sector.
Nevertheless, this excellent work, based on the long experience of a
communications lawyer who knows so well how the present policy has
failed, is a most commendable effort. At some point in this new century,
with so many dynamic market and technological changes coming on
stream, there may well be an overwhelming need to reform a regulatory
scheme based on the wholly different and more staid conditions of 1927
and 1934. If so, Carl Ramey's work is a great blueprint for that reform.

reformers like Norman Ornstein, Thomas Mann, or Tracey Westen. This issue should be
considered with campaign reform and is beyond the scope of Ramey's work or my review.
25. For a full discussion of the above reform, see Harry M. Shooshan III, A Modest
Proposalfor Restructuring the Federal Communications Commission, 50 FED. COMM. L.J.
637 (1998).
26. MASS MEDIA UNLEASHED, supranote 2, at 221.
27. Such efforts should not be denigrated. If the broadcaster is a public trustee, it is
simple logic that its public service obligations should be delineated so that both the
broadcaster and the public know what is being required. See Henry Geller, Public Interest
Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 348-62 (1998). It is
therefore no wonder that the public interest groups keep trying, even though history is
against them.

